The effect of reimbursement fee changes on service production for laboratory tests in Norwegian primary health care by Gjelsvik, Roar
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS
                                                                                         
No. 01/09
ROAR GJELSVIK
THE EFFECT OF REIMBURSEMENT
FEE CHANGES ON SERVICES
PRODUCTION FOR LABORATORY
TESTS IN NORWEGIAN PRIMARY
HEALTH CARE
  Department of Economics    ________________________
 U N I V E R S I T Y  OF  B E R G E N 
The effect of reimbursement fee changes on service production for laboratory tests in 





Department of Economics, University of Bergen 




This paper examines how changes in reimbursement fees influence the service production of 
laboratory tests among Norwegian primary care physicians. The data represent a panel of 
2,083 physicians paid on a fee-for-service basis for the period 2001–04. We construct a 
variable that measures the exogenous effect of changes in reimbursement fees on physician 
income. We measure service production by the number of laboratory tests per consultation, 
the relative change in the composition of laboratory tests, and the number of tests per 
consultation ordered from clinical laboratories. There are three main findings. First, 
physicians reduce the number of laboratory tests per consultation when fees decrease. Second, 
physicians change the composition of laboratory tests to tests that are more expensive when 
fees decrease. Finally, there is a spillover effect to the specialist health care sector because 
physicians who experience an income loss for tests analysed at the office laboratory order 
more tests from clinical laboratories. The results imply that fee regulation may be a simple 
means of controlling government expenditure. However, it is important to note the change in 
composition along with the potential spillover effects to other parts of the health care sector to 
obtain a complete picture of the influence of fee regulation on physician behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
Fee-for-service is a common scheme of reimbursement for physicians in primary health care 
services. In contrast to fixed salaries, the physician’s income then depends on the number of 
services provided, rather than the hours of work, thereby encouraging efficiency in service 
production (Sørensen and Grytten, 2003). However, a potential problem with fee-for-service 
schemes is cost control, and fee regulations constitute an often-used instrument for controlling 
physician income (Prendergast, 1999). An important issue is whether fee regulation is an 
efficient policy tool for influencing either the mix of services provided or total spending for 
physician services. In theory, fee regulation is a simple instrument for controlling costs; in 
practice, behavioural responses by physicians have shown this is not the case (Gruber et al., 
1999). 
The physician’s response to fee regulation depends on the relative strengths of two 
effects.
1 In the event of a fee reduction for an item of treatment, the substitution effect pulls in 
the direction of a lower treatment volume as a physician wishes to perform fewer of the less 
profitable treatments relative to other activities (where fees may be unchanged). The income 
effect pulls in the direction of higher treatment volume because the physician attempts to 
compensate for the loss of income. The latter effect can be especially large if the treatment 
whose fee has been reduced accounts for a significant share of the physician’s income 
(McGuire and Pauly, 1991). However, we cannot establish which effect dominates on 
theoretical grounds, leaving the provision of evidence to empirical investigation. 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between fee changes and service 
production among physicians. The majority of these studies relate to specialized health 
services in the US, predominantly from the 1980s and 1990s (Rice, 1983; Schwartz et al., 
                                                 
1 The physician response to fee changes is commonly discussed in terms of income and substitution effects; see 
e.g. Rice and Labelle (1989) and McGuire and Pauly (1991). In this literature, physicians are commonly 
modelled as self-employed utility-maximizing agents. This is more general than the standard profit-maximizing 
model that considers the physician as a profit-maximizing multiproduct firm (Mitchell et al., 2001).   3
1981; Hurley et al., 1990; Escarce, 1993; Yip, 1998; Rice and Labelle, 1989).
2 Evidence on 
fee changes and physician behaviour is mixed. Mitchell et al. (2000; 2002) point out that 
many of the results from early studies are unreliable because of methodological problems, 
with most important shortcomings related to omitted variables, the use of unreliable price 
variables and explanatory variables with poor validity. Yip (1998) and Mitchell et al. (2000) 
appear to be the first contributions that distinguish between income and substitution effects, as 
earlier studies consider only the total effect of fee changes on the supply of services (Grytten 
et al., 2007). Distinguishing between these two effects is of some empirical importance as fee 
changes for one type of service may affect not only the volume for the service in question, but 
also the volume for other services whose fees may be unchanged (McGuire and Pauly, 1991). 
Yip (1998) analysed physician responses to Medicare fee reductions for coronary bypass graft 
(CABG) procedures in 1994, and found a strong negative income effect for the number of 
CABGs. She also found that fee reductions led to an increased number of CABGs in the 
private sector, indicating strong substitution effects. Mitchell et al. (2000) studied 
ophthalmologist and orthopaedic surgeon responses to fee reductions, and found a weak 
negative income effect for the number of cataract operations, while there was a positive 
income effect for the number of joint procedures, the latter suggesting that a reduction in fees 
does not lead to any compensatory change in behaviour. However, the fee reductions for both 
procedures were associated with increased volume for other services, suggesting a 
substitution effect. Keeler and Fok (1996) and Gruber et al. (1999) investigated the effect of 
fee changes on the number of caesarean deliveries. While the former found that a change in 
fees had a small effect on the number of caesarean deliveries, the latter found that an increase 
in fees led to a significant increase in the number of caesarean deliveries, suggesting a strong 
substitution effect. 
                                                 
2 For a more complete list of studies, see Mitchell et al. (2000; 2002) or Grytten et al. (2007).   4
Few studies have investigated how changes in fees influence service production among 
primary care physicians. Hughes and Yule (1992) found that annual changes in fees over the 
period 1966–1989 did not influence the quantity of treatments related to maternity care and 
cervical cytology among physicians in the UK. Carlsen et al. (2003) and Grytten et al. (2007) 
found that changes in fees had no or little effect on the service level for laboratory tests 
among Norwegian physicians. However, the former study consists of a relatively small 
sample of physicians (n = 44) and the results should be interpreted with some caution, 
according to the authors. Both studies also use data from before the introduction of the list 
patient system in Norway in 2001. This reform introduced a larger element of competition 
among primary care physicians than previously found (Carlsen and Norheim, 2003). 
Importantly, physicians’ responses to fee changes may differ from their responses before the 
introduction of the list patient system as the market’s competitive structure influences 
behavioural responses to fee changes (Hadley and Reschovsky, 2006). Carlsen et al. (2003) 
and Grytten et al. (2007) mainly include control variables related to municipality 
characteristics in their analysis, omitting patient and (some) physician characteristics. 
According to Scott and Shiell (1997), these types of variables are important in explaining 
physician behaviour. 
The aim of this study is to evaluate how changes in reimbursement fees influence 
service production for laboratory tests among primary care physicians in Norway. The 
majority of these physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis, giving them an incentive to 
respond to fee changes. Fees are determined at the national level, and this makes the changes 
exogenous to the individual physician. Fee reductions implemented in 2004 for laboratory 
tests analysed at the physician’s office laboratory constitute a natural experiment for 
addressing the following questions. First, do primary care physicians respond to fee 
reductions by increasing the number of laboratory tests in order to compensate for the loss of   5
income? Second, do physicians alter their composition of laboratory analyses? Finally, is 
there a spillover effect from primary health care to specialist health care as physicians order 
more of their tests from external clinical laboratories? A panel data set covering 
reimbursement claims from 2,083 physicians paid on a fee-for-service basis over the period 
2001–04 is employed for the empirical investigation. As the data include patient and 
physician characteristics, along with municipality characteristics, this study improves on 
previous studies of primary care physicians. We identify the income and substitution effects 
by exploring how the loss of income due to fee reductions affects service production by 
physicians, as measured by the number of laboratory tests per consultation, the relative 
change in the composition of laboratory tests, and the number of tests per consultation ordered 
from clinical laboratories. 
The results show that the reduction in reimbursement fees has no income effect on the 
service level for laboratory tests analysed at the office laboratory. That is, physicians do not 
increase the number of tests analysed at the office laboratory to compensate for their income 
loss. However, there is evidence of a substitution effect, indicating that physicians change 
their composition of laboratory tests to tests that are more expensive when fees decrease. 
There is also a spillover of the fee reduction in primary health care into the specialist health 
care sector as physicians who experience a loss of income for tests analysed at the office 
laboratory order more of their laboratory tests from clinical laboratories. These findings 
suggest that income effects may not be as empirically important as the substitution and 
spillover effects. Failing to recognize these effects would then tend to understate the effects of 
fee regulation on physician behaviour and total spending on physician services. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
description of the Norwegian primary health care sector. Section 3 presents the theoretical 
background on how reimbursement cuts may affect physicians’ service level for laboratory   6
tests. The data and the empirical approach are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the 
empirical findings are discussed, while the final section offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Institutional background 
Municipalities in Norway (431 in 2006) are responsible for the organization of primary health 
care services, including primary care physician services. Two types of physicians, community 
physicians and contract physicians, mainly provide these services.
3 Both types of physicians 
work separately from the hospital service and are intended to provide the first contact between 
patients and the health care service. Community physicians represent about 14% of all 
primary care physicians (Statistics Norway, 2008). They are employed by a municipality and 
are paid according to a preset salary scheme for normal working hours. 
Contract physicians represent about 76% of primary physicians (Statistics Norway, 
2008). They are self-employed and have a contract with the municipality to cover some of 
their expenses (personnel, equipment, etc.). In addition, contract physicians obtain income 
from patient co-payments and receive payments from the National Insurance Agency (NIA) 
based on a fixed fee reimbursement scheme. The sizes of the municipality grant, co-payments, 
and reimbursement fees are regulated by a ‘normal tariff’, which is an annual agreement 
negotiated between the Norwegian Medical Association and the Ministry of Government 
Administration. The local government grant constitutes about 30% of the contract physician’s 
gross income, while co-payments and reimbursement fees, respectively, constitute the 
remaining 30% and 40% of gross income (Grytten et al., 2007). Community and contract 
physicians both use the same national reimbursement scheme. However, while contract 
physicians receive their income directly from the NIA, income generated by community 
                                                 
3 In addition, there are independent physicians (8%) and junior physicians (2%). Independent physicians do not 
have a contract with a municipality and tend to be located in major cities (Statistics Norway, 2008). Junior 
physicians are medical students who have completed their studies, but are not fully registered, needing to work 
for one year under the supervision of a municipality and a hospital before they are fully registered (Grytten et al., 
2007). Junior physicians mainly find employment in small municipalities (Statistics Norway, 2008).   7
physicians is paid to the municipalities. Hence, only contract physicians have an income 
motive or incentive to respond to changes in reimbursement fees. 
In Norway, primary health care physicians are able to analyse tests at their office 
laboratory and/or order tests from external clinical laboratories. The physicians are 
reimbursed by the NIA according to the type of test analysed at the office laboratory. Tests 
ordered from clinical laboratories are reimbursed according to the type of sample and the 
number of samples shipped by the physician to the laboratory.
4 About 1,900 (99%) physician 
offices have laboratory facilities and 24% of the reimbursement claims (including co-
payments) to the NIA are related to the use of laboratory services (Fauli and Thue, 2005; 
Nossen, 2007). Laboratory tests are highly used relative to other European countries, mainly 
because of geographical factors (distance to hospital, etc.) and economic incentives (Fauli and 
Thue, 2005). Fee changes for tests analysed at the office laboratory may therefore have a 
considerable effect on physician income. 
Table 1 details changes in the reimbursement fees for all laboratory tests (mean) and for 
the three tests most frequently analysed at the office laboratory among primary care 
physicians for the period 2001–04. The fees for all laboratory tests have, on average, 
increased each year. However, in July 2004, they were reduced by (on average) 29%. Some 
fees were reduced only moderately, and others more heavily. For example, the fees for 
immunology and PT–INR (Prothrombin Time–International Normalized Ratio) tests fell by 
58% and 33%, respectively.
5 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
4 In this case, the fees for clinical laboratories that are part of the specialized health care services (and often 
attached to a hospital) are reimbursed by the NIA according to the type of test ordered (following a tariff scale). 
5 The objective of the fee reductions was not to change the service level or the mix of laboratory tests provided at 
the physician’s office. Rather, the reductions were a monetary transfer from reimbursement fees to the 
government grant, as well as an increase in the use of co-payments. The size of the fee reduction depended on 
the total national volume of the specific laboratory test and costs (Norwegian Medical Association, 2004).   8
 
Before the fee changes in 2004, patients paid a co-payment (code: 701a) only when 
laboratory tests were analysed outside the physician’s office laboratory (i.e., the blood sample 
was sent to an external clinical laboratory). After July 2004, patients had to pay a co-payment 
each time a test was analysed. However, the co-payment was paid only once per consultation.
6 
Consequently, the impact of the fee reductions on income varied among physicians according 
to practice style. In particular, physicians who tended to analyse several tests at the office 
laboratory during a consultation experienced a drop in income, as the additional co-payment 
would not cover the fee reductions. Physicians who often combined tests analysed at the 
office laboratory with tests ordered from clinical laboratories also experienced a drop in 
income, because they could claim the co-payment only once per consultation. On the other 
hand, physicians who tended to analyse one laboratory test during a consultation might 
benefit from the change, provided the co-payment made up for the fee reduction. However, 
most consultations involving laboratory tests include more than just one test. Hence, the 
majority of physicians experienced a drop in income. 
 
3. Theoretical background 
The theoretical framework underlying the empirical analysis is based on the McGuire and 
Pauly (1991) model of physician response to fee changes in a single-payer market.
7 This 
model views the physician as a utility-maximizing agent, where the physician’s utility is a 
function increasing in income and leisure and reducing in effort. Standard profit-maximizing 
theory predicts that physicians will respond to fee reductions by reducing the service level for 
the affected procedure (Mitchell et al., 2002). However, the McGuire and Pauly model 
                                                 
6 To clarify, the patient pays the co-payment and it is not reimbursed by the NIA. However, the size of the 
payment is centrally determined in the ‘normal tariff’ and is listed alongside other fees in the tariff scale. The 
remainder of the fees relating to laboratory tests are reimbursed by the NIA. 
7 We outline only the main assumptions and results from the McGuire and Pauly model here. For details and 
comparative statics, see McGuire and Pauly (1991) and McGuire (2000).   9
postulates that a physician may respond to fee reductions by increasing the service level to 
compensate for the loss of income. Hence, the model differs from profit-maximizing theory 
by accommodating both benchmark cases of profit maximization and target income, subject to 
time constraints, effort, and available income. 
In formal terms, the single-payer model with a physician providing two tests (1 and 2) 
analysed at the office laboratory can be written as U = U (I, L, E1, E2), where the physician 
maximizes U by deciding how much effort (E1, E2) to expend during a consultation, subject to 
time/leisure (L = 24 – X1(E1)h1 – X2(E2)h2) and income (I = X1(E1)m1 + X2(E2)m2). E1 and E2 
are effort related to analysing tests at the office laboratory, I is total income, L is leisure, and 
h1 and h2 are time per unit provided. The numbers of laboratory tests 1 and 2 analysed at the 
office laboratory are represented by X1 and X2. The fee levels for the laboratory tests affect the 
physician’s income through the profit margin. The profit margins, defined as fees minus costs 
(laboratory equipment, personnel, etc.), for the two laboratory tests at the office are m1 and 
m2, respectively. The physician’s utility U increases in net income (I) and leisure (L), but 
decreases in effort (E): UI > 0; UL > 0; UE < 0; UII < 0; ULL < 0; UEE < 0; ULE = UIL = UIE = 0. 
The choice variable in the utility maximization is effort, which yields the optimal amount of 
effort (E1*, E2*), where the service volume is increasing in effort.
8 
The expected change in the quantity of X1 and X2 due to a fee reduction for, say 
laboratory test 1 (m1 reduced), is theoretically ambiguous because of two counteracting 
effects: an income effect, which depends on the impact of the fee change on the physician’s 
income, and a substitution effect, which depends on the profit margin for alternative services. 
McGuire and Pauly (1991) show that the income effect is the key determinant of the physician 
                                                 
8 For most diagnoses, a ‘right treatment’ does not exist; rather, there is an interval for what is the medically 
acceptable treatment (Enthoven, 1980). By increasing effort, the physician may start ordering more or different 
laboratory tests within this interval. Efforts outside the interval could be regarded as fraudulent.   10
response to fee changes.
9 In this context, two polar cases have received attention in the 
literature: the profit-maximization case with no income effect, and the target income case with 
a strong income effect.
10 If there are no income effects, then the profit-maximization 
hypothesis implies that the fee cut for laboratory test 1 will lead to a decrease in X1 and an 
increase in X2 (where the decrease in X1 is greater than the increase in X2). If this is the case, 
the substitution effect dominates the income effect, and the service volume of tests analysed at 
the office laboratory will fall. By contrast, with strong income effects, the physician may 
increase both X1 and X2 to compensate for the income loss (i.e., such as It = It+1). The income 
effect then dominates the substitution effect, and the service volume of tests analysed at the 
office laboratory will increase. Actual physician behaviour is likely to fall between these two 
cases. The effect of the fee reduction for laboratory test 1 on effort for test 1 is ambiguous, 
depending on the substitution and the income effects, but unambiguous for test 2—effort 
should increase because both effects work in the same direction (McGuire, 2000). Ultimately, 
determining the relative strength of the income and the substitution effects remains an 
empirical question. 
An alternative for the physician to analysing tests at the office laboratory is to order 
them from external clinical laboratories. In this sense, the existence of clinical laboratories 
provides an avenue for reducing the loss of income due to fee cuts for tests analysed at the 
office laboratory. Following Mitchell et al. (2002) and Yip (1998), we can use the same 
framework to analyse spillover effects—how a decline in fees for tests analysed at the office 
laboratory affects the service volume for tests ordered from clinical laboratories. Letting X2 in 
our model represent tests ordered from clinical laboratories, reductions in fees (m1) for tests 
analysed at the office laboratory will not increase the number of tests from clinical 
                                                 
9 McGuire and Pauly (1991) worked out comparative statics for cases where only the income effect matters 
(target income theory) and when the income effect does not matter at all (profit-maximizing theory). 
10 In the literature, profit maximization is defined as the case where UII → 0. The target income hypothesis is 
where UII → –∞ (McGuire, 2000).   11
laboratories if there are no income effects (Mitchell et al., 2002). However, the presence of a 
strong income effect will lead to an increase in the number of laboratory tests ordered from 
clinical laboratories (the spillover effect), instead of analysing the same tests at the office 
laboratory, for example.
11 Changes in the marginal utility of leisure may also result in 
spillover effects. If the fee cuts reduce the volume of X1, then the amount of time performing 
tests at the office laboratory decreases and the marginal utility of leisure increases. In turn, 
this gives the physician an incentive to increase X2 to restore the optimum. If this is the case, 
then the fee cuts in 2004 for tests analysed at the office laboratory may have resulted in an 
increase in tests ordered from clinical laboratories. 
As the physician’s income from laboratory tests constitutes a large part of total practice 
income, and because the marginal cost is low in relation to the fee, McGuire and Pauly (1991) 
argue that the income effect should dominate the substitution effect. Conversely, several 
factors influence the physician effort (E1 and E2), including medical guidelines, the 
competitive structure in the market, and the payment rules or mechanisms for limiting fee 
abuse (Hadley and Reschovsky, 2006). For example, in Norway, the NIA undertakes regular 
controls of physician practices that probably subdue any extreme behavioural responses to fee 
changes. We outline the empirical model below used to test the above hypotheses. 
 
4. Data and empirical model 
Data on individual physicians were obtained from the NIA. The data provided are primarily 
used by the NIA for administrative purposes and for monitoring physician activities, treatment 
patterns, and levels of expenses (Grytten et al., 2007). All primary care physicians (both 
contract and community) in Norway must register their activities, and each year data are 
collected for a sample of physicians, mainly concerning activities during September and 
                                                 
11 In this case, one would expect that the tests regarded as unprofitable would be from clinical laboratories, while 
the profitable tests are those still analysed by the physician at the office laboratory.   12
October. However, the data are somewhat limited because only electronic reimbursement 
claims are registered, thereby excluding paper-based reimbursement claims. However, the 
proportion of physicians using electronic patient journals is high.
12 Hence, the data are 
expected to be representative of the population of primary care physicians in Norway. 
We constructed a panel data set comprising 2,083 contract physicians observed for the 
years 2001 to 2004.
13 Each physician in the panel is observed during September and October 
in each year except 2004, where we observe the physicians in October, November, and 
December. Because we are interested in evaluating yearly changes in service production, the 
observations have been aggregated into one-year observations for the 2,083 physicians. The 
year 2001 is the base year for constructing the lagged independent variable (Eq. 1). We 
therefore exclude observations for 2001 from the final sample. 
Following Mitchell et al. (2000), the independent variable used to estimate the income 
effect on service production is constructed in the following manner. The income of each 
physician from all laboratory services provided in year t–1 is calculated. We then calculate 
what the income would be from laboratory services in year t with the same service level as in 
year t–1, but with the reimbursement fees of year t. The difference between the actual and 
predicted income is interpreted as the component of change in total physician income from 
laboratory services due to changes in the national fee schedule (Grytten et al., 2007). 
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12 About 90% of primary care physicians used electronic patient journals in 2000 (Ellingson and Monteiro, 
2003). This proportion is higher today. 
13 In addition, 160 community physicians in the data set serve as a control group in the analysis.   13
where Ljit is the number of laboratory tests of type j provided by physician i in year t, and Rjt 
is the reimbursement fee for laboratory test j in year t. Iit is physician specific because relative 
fees vary over time and laboratory services vary across physicians. Further, as Iit is 
constructed from data on lagged quantities and exogenous fees, Iit does not depend on Ljit and 
is therefore exogenous to physician responses to fee changes (Mitchell et al., 2002). 
Using income change Iit as our key explanatory variable, we analyse the effect of fee 
changes on the following dependent variables: (i) the number of laboratory tests analysed at 
the office laboratory per consultation, (ii) the relative change in service composition for tests 
analysed at the office laboratory, and (iii) the number of tests ordered from clinical 
laboratories per consultation. The three dependent variables measure the physicians’ service 
production for laboratory tests. The construction and interpretation of the dependent variables 
are outlined below. 
The number of laboratory tests per consultation for physician i in year t measures the 
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where Cit is the number of consultations provided by physician i in year t. To track changes in 
the composition of services provided due to fee changes, we construct a dependent variable 
that measures each physician’s relative change in service composition for year t and t–1. 
Average reimbursement for all laboratory services in year t and t–1 is calculated using 
reimbursement fees in year t–1 for each physician. Formally, this can be written as:
14 
 
                                                 
14 Sit parallels the Laspeyres quantity index (subtracted from 1) used to compare average consumption in year t 
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it Y = 0, the physician has not changed the composition of laboratory services between year 
t–1 and t. If 
ii
it Y  > 0, the physician has changed the composition of services at the office, 
providing a greater number (relative to the total number of services) of expensive laboratory 
services in year t than in year t–1. The number of tests ordered from clinical laboratories per 
consultation for physician i in year t measures the physicians’ use of tests from clinical 
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where Lkit is the number of laboratory tests of type k ordered from clinical laboratories by 
physician i in year t. 
The following fixed-effects model is estimated for each dependent variable to account 
for unobserved but time-invariant physician characteristics:
15 
 
it i it 3 it 2 it 1
*
it X Z I Y ε α β β β + + + + = , (5) 
 
where β1 captures the effect of fee change on service production. The variable αi is a 
physician-specific effect included to take account for time-constant effects that are physician 
specific. Grytten and Sørensen (2003) showed that there are large variations in practice 
profile, but that these variations are stable over time. εit is an identically and independently 
                                                 
15 An asterisk indicates the dependent variables (i), (ii) and (iii).   15
distributed error term and Zit is a vector of control variables related to patient composition and 
physician characteristics. These variables are constructed from the data provided by the NIA. 
Xit is a vector of control variables at the municipality level that may influence the physicians’ 
service production of laboratory tests. These variables are from Statistics Norway.
16 All 
variables included in the model are defined in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
A priori, the sign for our key explanatory variable Iit (Eq. 1) is undetermined in the three 
regression models (Eq. 5). However, from the theory in McGuire and Pauly (1991), some 
expectations can be postulated for these models. First, the physicians may increase the 
number of tests analysed at the office laboratory (
i
it Y ) in response to fee reductions. If this is 
the case, then the McGuire and Pauly model indicates a strong income effect, and the 
estimated coefficient for the income change variable is expected to be negative. Second, the 
physicians may respond to fee reductions by substituting away from tests with a low profit 
margin (or with a high price reduction) to tests with a higher profit margin (or a low price 
reduction). If this is the case, the income change variable is expected to have a negative 
coefficient when the physician’s average reimbursement claim to the NIA increases (
ii
it Y ), 
thereby indicating a substitution effect. Lastly, when fees are reduced for tests analysed at the 
office laboratory, physicians may also substitute away from analysing tests at the office 
laboratory to ordering tests from clinical laboratories (
iii
it Y ), because the profit margin for tests 
at the office is lower than that for tests ordered from clinical laboratories. The direction of this 
(cross-price) effect depends on the relative size of the income effect (McGuire and Pauly, 
                                                 
16 We measure both salaries and rents at the economic region level, as these data are not available at the 
municipal level. An economic region consists of a town or a population centre that makes up a central point, 
surrounded by smaller municipalities. Norway comprises 89 economic regions, and we link the physicians’ 
practice municipalities to these economic regions.   16
1991). We do not measure cross-price effects directly; however, this spillover effect is made 
evident by using the potential change in income as a measure of the physician’s volume 
response (Yip, 1998; Mitchell et al., 2002). If so, then the income change variable is expected 
to have a negative coefficient. We now turn to the estimation results. 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 reports the level and percentage changes in consultations and laboratory tests, and the 
number of laboratory tests per consultation for the period 2001–04, excluding laboratory tests 
ordered from clinical laboratories. The average number of consultations per month increased 
over the whole period, implying that the number of laboratory tests should also increase.
17 
However, while the volume of laboratory tests increased by 6.8% between 2002 and 2003, 
there was no growth between 2003 and 2004. Hence, the mean number of laboratory tests per 
consultation fell between 2003 and 2004. This observation is consistent with the profit-
maximization hypothesis, i.e., lower fees result in a decreased volume of laboratory tests. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression model, 
including the income change variable (Eq. 1) and the service-mix variable (Eq. 3). In 2002 
and 2003, physicians had a small potential monthly gain in income, while in 2004 the fee 
reductions led to a large potential monthly loss of income of about NOK 2,400 (€300). The 
relative change in the physicians’ service mix was positive during the whole period, 
indicating that each year physicians provide a greater number of expensive laboratory services 
than in the previous year. 
                                                 
17 It is reasonable to expect that the number of services provided during a physician visit increases as the number 
of consultations per month increases, unless it concerns consultations demanding no services beyond simply 
consulting with the physician (a somewhat preposterous explanation).   17
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
About 7% of physicians have expensive/advanced laboratory equipment (cell-counter 
and dry-chemistry machines). The proportion using advanced laboratory equipment decreased 
during the sample period with a large fall in 2004. This may indicate that over time laboratory 
tests analysed by these types of machines have become more unprofitable. The proportion of 
physicians that are specialists in general medicine has increased. This is of no surprise 
because economic incentives in the reimbursement scheme stimulate physicians to engage in 
further training.
18 Overall, the majority of the control variables are stable over time. 
Exceptions include the rental prices and wages, which increase each year (as expected). The 
descriptive statistics indicate that there have not been any considerable changes in the 
characteristics of physicians, patients, or communities over the period that should drive 
changes in the dependent variable. 
 
5.1 Tests analysed at the office laboratory 
Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates for (i) the number of laboratory tests analysed at the 
office laboratory, and (ii) the relative change in the service composition for tests analysed at 
the office laboratory. To assess to what degree physician, patient, and community 
characteristics affect our key explanatory variable, we estimate Eq. 5 stepwise by including 
groups of explanatory variables one at a time. Model 1 includes no control variables, while 
Model 2 includes physician and patient characteristics as control variables. Model 3 is the full 
model including all the control variables outlined earlier. 
 
                                                 
18 Physicians that are specialists in general medicine receive an extra payment on top of the normal consultation 
fee; hence, all contract physicians have an incentive to undertake further training to become a specialist.   18
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Examining (i) the number of tests analysed at the office laboratory per consultation, we 
see that the coefficient for the income variable is positive and highly significant, irrespective 
of the model specification (Models 1–3). The estimated coefficient is twice the size when 
municipality characteristics are included as controls in Model 3, indicating that control 
variables at the municipality level are important in explaining physician behaviour. Taken 
together, the results suggest that physicians who face a decline in income reduce the volume 
of laboratory tests analysed at the office. The estimated coefficient also tells us that physicians 
use less time analysing tests at the office laboratory, as theoretically expected. However, even 
if the coefficient is highly significant, the magnitude is small. In Model 3, the number of tests 
per consultation is reduced by 3% per NOK 1,000 (€125) income loss, equivalent to a 
reduction of five laboratory tests per month. Examining the interaction term 
‘Income*community physician’, we can see that the estimated coefficient is positive in Model 
3 although insignificant, suggesting that community physician behaviour does not differ from 
contract physicians. 
The other variables included in the model have the predicted signs. A physician who has 
invested in expensive laboratory equipment has a relatively higher volume of laboratory 
services. Physicians that are part of a group practice analyse fewer laboratory tests than solo 
practice physicians do. Both the wage and the rent variables have the expected positive signs. 
As the input prices increase, physicians perform more laboratory services. Another 
observation is that when unemployment increases, the number of tests increases. Overall, the 
key results are robust to alternative specifications. 
Examining (ii) the relative change in the service mix, we find that the estimated 
coefficient for the income variable is negative and highly significant in all three models. This   19
implies that physicians meet the fee reductions by changing the composition of laboratory 
tests to tests that are more expensive. The average reimbursement claim for laboratory tests 
increases by 21% per NOK 1,000 (€125) income loss. Examining the interaction term 
‘Income*community physician’, we can see that the estimated coefficient is positive and 
significant in Models 1 and 2, but becomes insignificant in Model 3, suggesting that the 
community physicians’ behaviour here also does not differ from that of the contract 
physicians. 
The control variables included in Models 2 and 3 are generally insignificant. The 
number of patients older than 68 years has a positive effect on service composition, while the 
physician population has a negative effect on service composition. The former is related to the 
fact that the elderly have poorer health and greater need for more advanced (read expensive) 
laboratory tests. The latter may be explained by the fact that when competition increases, it 
has a positive effect on the number of tests analysed at the office. If this relates to the use of 
simpler tests (read less expensive), their increased use contributes to a fall in average 
reimbursement claims to the NIA. 
 
5.2 Tests ordered from external clinical laboratories 
Physicians can either analyse laboratory tests in their own laboratory or order them from a 
clinical laboratory. The theoretical model predicts that if the margin for analysing a specific 
test at the physician’s office is less than the margin for sending it away (after the fee is 
reduced for tests analysed at the physician’s office laboratory), the physician may start 
ordering that specific type of laboratory test from clinical laboratories in their place. In this 
way, physicians can limit their income loss due to the reduction in fees. 
There are two challenges related to analysing the number of tests ordered from clinical 
laboratories. First, it is not possible to identify uniquely which type of laboratory test is   20
ordered from the clinical laboratory during a consultation. Second, it is also not possible to 
identify uniquely in 2004 consultations which clinical laboratories tests are ordered from. This 
is because only four different fees exist for ordering tests from clinical laboratories. The first 
is the co-payment for the taking and shipment of a blood sample, while the last three are fees 
(reimbursed by the NIA) for the additional shipment of blood and other types of samples. 
These fees are used independently of the type of laboratory test that is ordered. In addition, 
before 2004, patients paid a co-payment only when laboratory tests were analysed outside the 
physician’s office (i.e., the blood sample was sent to a clinical laboratory). After July 2004, 
patients had to pay each time a blood sample was taken in the office.
19 
Because there is a natural increase in co-payments due to the new regulations in 2004, 
including the co-payments in the analysis of laboratory tests ordered from clinical laboratories 
will presumably bias the results. To cope with this challenge, three different dependent 
variables are constructed. These are: (1) the mean number of laboratory analyses per 
consultation sent to clinical laboratories, including co-payments; (2) the mean number of 
laboratory analyses per consultation sent to clinical laboratories, excluding co-payments; and 
(3) the mean number of laboratory analyses per consultation, including ‘dummy ’co-payments 
for each consultation in 2001–03 where tests were analysed at the office laboratory (assuming 
that the change in the reimbursement scheme in 2004 was already in force). Table 6 reports 
the average change in the number of laboratory tests per consultation from clinical 
laboratories during the period 2001–04 for the three dependent variables. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
                                                 
19 Assume that a physician needs to do an INR test (code 710) for a patient. He/she can then choose between two 
scenarios: (a) order the test from a clinical laboratory, or (b) analyse the test at the office laboratory. Before 
2004, physicians could only claim the co-payment (code 701a) in scenario (a). Since 2004, they can also claim 
the co-payment in scenario (b). This gives us the following coding for the consultations: before 2004, (a) 701a, 
(b) 710; after 2004, (a) 701a, (b) 701a + 710. It is not possible to separate the two scenarios, because scenario (b) 
can now indicate two different things: (1) that the physician analyses an INR test at the office laboratory, or (2) 
he/she analyses an INR test at the office laboratory and orders a test from a clinical laboratory.   21
 
Each of the dependent variables constructed has its own weaknesses. In variable 
construction (1), we see that between 2002 and 2003 the volume of laboratory analyses was 
almost constant, while between 2003 and 2004 growth was 62%. The latter can be explained 
as a ‘natural increase’ because of the change in the regulation of co-payments in 2004. Any 
income effect will with some certainty be overstated when using this dependent variable. In 
variable construction (2), which excludes co-payments, there is a decrease in the number of 
laboratory tests per consultation each year, except from 2001 to 2002. This indicates that the 
observed growth in variable (1) is largely driven by co-payments. However, the exclusion of 
co-payments will underestimate possible growth. This implies that the potential income effect, 
if any, will be underestimated. Variable construction (3) shows growth each year more in line 
with what would be ‘expected’. However, including a co-payment dummy variable provides 
room for potential measurement errors. 
Table 7 reports the results for (iii) tests ordered from external clinical laboratories using 
the three dependent variables. The analysis is undertaken using a fixed-effects model with the 
same assumptions outlined earlier.
20 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
If a fee reduction for tests analysed at the office results in substantial income losses, 
physicians may attempt to offset the income losses by ordering more tests from clinical 
laboratories. In the literature, this is known as the ‘spillover effect’.
21 If such behaviour exists, 
then the estimated coefficient for the income variable should have a negative sign (Yip, 1998; 
                                                 
20 One possibility would be to include one of the three dependent variables as a control variable in the analysis of 
tests analysed at the office laboratory. However, this would mean adding an endogenous variable to the model. 
Hence, we divide the analysis between tests analysed at the office and the clinical laboratory. 
21 See e.g. Yip (1998) and Mitchell et al. (2000; 2002).   22
Mitchell et al., 2002). Regardless of which dependent variable and specification we use, the 
estimated coefficient is negative and highly significant. As expected, the coefficient is largest 
using variable construction (1). However, this variable is upwardly biased. Excluding co-
payments from dependent variable (2) makes the size of the estimated coefficient smaller. 
However, this variable is downwardly biased. Surprisingly, even if there is a decrease in the 
total service volume, the coefficient is still negative and highly significant. The third variable 
construction (3) yields the same results, and together with (2) can be regarded as providing 
the upper and lower limit. Taken together, the results indicate that physicians who experience 
a substantial drop in income for laboratory tests analysed at the office increase the number of 
tests ordered from clinical laboratories by between 1.7% and 8.2% per NOK 1,000 income 
loss. It is evident that it has become more profitable to order tests from clinical laboratories 
since the fee change because of the change in relative prices for the two types of laboratory 
services (office laboratory vs clinical laboratory). The interactive term ‘Income*community 
physician’ also suggests that the behaviour of community physicians does not differ from that 
of contract physicians. 
 
5.3 Specification and robustness tests 
Several specification and robustness tests are run to further verify the results. First, the 
service-mix variable (Eq. 3) was constructed with reimbursement fees in year t instead of t–1. 
There is a potential measurement error in this variable because a laboratory test that was 
below the average payment from the NIA in year t–1 may be above it in year t (or vice 
versa).
22 However, all of the main conclusions remain unaltered when estimating the models 
with this version of the service-mix variable. We also multiplied the two service-mix 
variables and took their square root. This specification resembles a Fisher quantity index as 
                                                 
22 Sit then parallels a Paasche quantity index (subtracted from 1). See Varian (1996, p. 130).   23
the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche quantity indexes (Dumagan, 2002). 
However, running the regressions with this variable did not change the main result—when 
fees fall, physicians provide a greater number of expensive laboratory tests. 
Second, Models 2 and 3 for laboratory services provided at the office were estimated for 
community physicians alone (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Community physicians have a 
fixed salary, and therefore have no incentive to respond to fee changes. For (i) the number of 
tests analysed at the office and (ii) the relative change in service mix, we do not find any 
significant results for the income variable. Compared with the results in Tables 5 and 7, this 
may be an indication that the number of community physicians (n = 162) is too small to give 
any significant results in the estimations. Hence, the ‘Income*community physician’ 
interaction term should be interpreted with caution. On the other hand, the income variable is 
positive and significant for ordering variables from clinical laboratories (using variable 
construction 3). This suggests that community physicians may have some compensatory 
behaviour related to budget commitments towards the community. 
Finally, as it is not plausible to say that the three equations are independent, the error 
term in each equation could be correlated. Following Yip (1998), we take the first difference 
of each variable. We then estimate the three dependent variables using seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) in order to account for correlations across equations to see whether this 
changes the key results (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
23 The estimated coefficient becomes 
slightly larger for (i) the number of tests analysed at the office laboratory and (ii) the service 
mix, while the estimated coefficients for (iii) the number of tests ordered from clinical 
laboratories became slightly smaller for all three specifications. Even though there are some 
small changes in the coefficients, none of the main results changes using this approach. 
 
                                                 
23 See Greene (2000) for a discussion of SUR.   24
6. Concluding remarks 
Changes in the reimbursement fees for health care services can add up to profound changes in 
physician income. Economic theory predicts that fee changes may cause physicians to alter 
the service volume as well as the mix of services provided. Fee changes may also result in 
spillover effects that cause physicians to change the service level of other health care services. 
In this study, we examined how a change in reimbursement fees affects the number and 
composition of laboratory tests performed by Norwegian primary care physicians. Following 
Yip (1998) and Mitchell at al. (2000), we constructed a separate variable that measures the 
exogenous effect of changes in reimbursement fees on physician income. The estimated 
coefficient of this variable on the service level is interpreted as an income effect. In addition, 
we constructed a separate variable that measures the relative change in service mix. We can 
interpret the estimated coefficient of the income variable on the service mix as the substitution 
effect. 
There are three main findings. First, there is a positive and small income effect for the 
number of tests analysed at the physician’s office laboratory, suggesting that physicians that 
experience a loss of income reduce their service volume. However, while the estimated 
coefficient is highly significant, its magnitude is small. This finding suggests that physicians 
behave more like profit maximizers and do not pursue a target income strategy. Second, the 
estimated coefficient for the income variable on the relative change in service mix is negative. 
This implies a substitution effect, as physicians change their composition of laboratory tests to 
tests that are more expensive when fees decrease. Third, there is a small negative income 
effect for the number of laboratory tests ordered from clinical laboratories. Three dependent 
variables are constructed where the estimated coefficient for the income change variable is 
negative in all three specifications, suggesting that physicians who experience a loss of 
income from tests analysed at the office order more tests from clinical laboratories. The latter   25
provides evidence of a spillover effect from the primary health care sector to the specialist 
health care sector. 
These results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions, and are in line 
with findings from earlier panel data studies of primary physician services in Norway. Neither 
Carlsen et al. (2003) nor Grytten et al. (2007) find negative income effects of fee changes on 
service production. However, neither study examined substitution and spillover effects as in 
this study. McGuire (2000) argues that income effects matter when studying fee changes and 
physician behaviour, but they may not be as empirically important as substitution effects, that 
is, how changes in fees for one service change the volume of other services.
24 A potential 
problem arising when physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis is cost control 
(Prendergast, 1999). In theory, reducing fees to physicians is a simple mechanism for 
controlling costs. In practice, this may be difficult because of behavioural responses by 
physicians (Gruber et al., 1999). Our results provide new insights regarding physician 
responses to fee changes in primary health care, as we examine and find evidence for 
substitution and spillover effects. These results point out the importance of distinguishing 
between income and substitution effects. 
While our findings have proven robust to various specification and robustness tests, the 
analysis has some limitations. First, our sample contains relatively few community 
physicians. The results for this group might have been different if the number had been larger. 
According to theory (Prendergast, 1999; Sørensen and Grytten, 2003), we should expect 
community physicians not to respond to fee changes. As the sample is representative of the 
population of community physicians in Norway, we have no reason to omit this group from 
the analysis. However, after comparing the results for community physicians in Tables 5 and 
A1, we have reason to believe the insignificant results are due to a ‘small sample problem’ 
                                                 
24 See McGuire (2000, p. 514) for a discussion of this topic.   26
regarding explanatory power. Second, there is a possible endogeneity problem when 
estimating the effect of the fee change on (ii) the relative change in service mix because  1 t L −  
enters into both sides of Eq. 5.
25 An alternative strategy would be to estimate the model using 
a fixed-effects instrumental variable method. On the one hand, it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to find any instrument that affects only the income change variable and not the 
service-mix variable because of the nature of their construction.
26 On the other hand, a simple 
check for correlation shows us that the two variables are only weakly negatively correlated, 
indicating that the variables are quite independent.
27 Further, the sign of the estimated 
coefficient is negative (as theoretically expected), and following the calculation in 
Wooldridge (2008) for determining the bias for the estimated coefficient for the income 
variable in a simple model (without any explanatory variables) indicates that the estimator is 
underestimated (e.g., should be more negative).
28 Even though this simple calculation can 
serve as a useful guide only, it suggests that while there is a substitution effect present, its size 
may be undetermined. 
Combined, the findings have important implications regarding the ramifications of fee 
regulation. First, focusing only on the volume of responses for services where fees have been 
reduced, especially those involving several procedures, implies that one will obtain an 
incomplete picture as the service mix will probably change. One of the major concerns with 
the reduction in fees is that it may lead to deterioration in the quality of care, namely, an 
unwanted service mix or where some services are not supplied at all. Second, there is no 
evidence that physicians are following a target income strategy. McGuire and Pauly (1991) 
point out that when income effects are trivial or non-existent, substitution effects appear to 
                                                 
25 This relates to a simultaneity bias problem where an explanatory variable is determined simultaneously with 
the dependent variable, making the explanatory variable correlated with the error term (Wooldridge, 2008). 
26 We attempt several estimations using fixed-effects instrumental variables. However, we have to conclude that 
data do not contain any useful instruments for solving the potential endogeneity problem. 
27 The correlation coefficient is –0.14. Calculating the variance inflation factor after running (ii) gives a value of 
1.08. This suggests that there is no problem relating to multicollinearity. 
28 See Wooldridge (2008, p. 552) for a discussion of this topic.   27
dominate. Our results for Norwegian primary physicians appear to confirm this, thereby 
verifying the empirical importance of substitution effects. 
Finally, it is evident that fee regulation in one part of the health care sector may lead to 
spillover effects into other parts of the health care sector. This has been shown for several 
types of procedures in specialist health care in the US (Yip, 1998; Mitchell et al., 2001), but 
not within a primary health care setting. Such spillover effects may not be negative if the cost 
of analysing tests is the same in both cases. However, analysing tests at clinical laboratories is 
overall more expensive than at the physician’s office laboratory. Some tests have also been 
proven cost beneficial when analysed at the office, often because the test result is available 
immediately (Fauli and Thue, 2008). This indicates that fee regulation ought to be considered 
from a cost–benefit perspective, as well as in accordance with existing medical guidelines, 
instead of across the board. In summary, the results suggest that fee regulations have the 
potential to influence physician behaviour and help control government expenditure. 
However, failing to recognize the potential substitution and spillover effects tends to 
understate the effects of fee regulations on total spending. In this case, if the objective of the 
fee reductions is to control physician income, the authorities may not achieve any savings.   28
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Reimbursement fees for laboratory tests 2001–04 in NOK 
Year  Fees for laboratory 
tests (mean) 
Co-payment
(a) Fee  for 
immunology test
(b) 
Fee for PT–INR 
test
(c) 
  NOK Change  (%) NOK Change  (%) NOK Change  (%) NOK Change  (%)
2001  42.9   25   40   65   
2002  45.1  5.0 35  4.0 38  –5.0  70  7.7 
2003  47.3  4.4 35  0.0 48  26.3  70  0.0 
2004  33.7  –29.3 47  34.3  20  –58.3 47  –32.9 
2001–04 
(%) 
 –22.5   88.0   –50.0   –27.7 
(a) Code 701a: Taking of blood samples for testing at the physician’s office laboratory or for shipment to 
external clinical laboratory, (b) Code 705k: Immunology test, (c) Code 710: Prothrombin Time (PT)–
International Normalized Ratio (INR) test. 
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Table 2  
Variable definition 
(i) Service level  Number of tests analysed at the office laboratory per consultation. 
(ii) Service mix 
 
 






Relative change in service mix between year t and t–1 measured as 
average reimbursement for all laboratory services in year t and t–1, 
using reimbursement fees of year t–1.  
Number of tests ordered from clinical laboratories per consultation 
Magnitude of potential change in income measured as total laboratory 
services supplied in year t–1, multiplied by change in reimbursement 
fees between period t and t–1 (in NOK 1,000). 
 





Sharing patient list 
List size 
Women 
Patient age < 6 years 
Patient age > 68 years 
Number of diagnoses 
Dummy = 1 if physician has cell-counter and dry-chemistry machines 
Dummy = 1 if physician is specialist in general medicine 
Dummy = 1 if physician is part of group practice 
Dummy = 1 if physician shares patient list with other physicians 
Number of patients on the physician’s patient list (log) 
Proportion of women in consultation (log) 
Proportion of patients under 6 years of age in consultations (log) 
Proportion of elderly > 68 years of age in consultations (log) 
Number of diagnoses per consultation (log) 




Cost of labour 
Prop. high education  
 
Prop. unemployed 
Prop. disabled    
Average rental price for a standard residence in the economic region 
(log) 
Average salaries for all employees in the economic region (log) 
Proportion of individuals in the municipality with more than 12 years’ 
schooling (log) 
Proportion of unemployed in the municipality (log) 
Proportion of disabled pensioners in the municipality (log) 
† The variable ‘community physicians’ is a dummy = 1 if physician is a community physician, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3 
Level and percentage changes, consultations, laboratory tests and laboratory tests per consultation, 
contract physicians, 2001–04 
  Number of consultations 
per month 
Number of laboratory 
tests per month 
Number of laboratory 
tests per consultation 
Year Actual  Change  (%)  Actual  Change (%)  Actual  Change (%) 
2001 260    117.8    0.453   
2002 267  2.7  116.7  –0.9  0.437  –3.5 
2003 277  3.6  124.6  6.8  0.450  3.0 
2004 288  4.0  124.9  0.1  0.434  –3.6 
2001–04 (%)    10.8    6.0    –4.2 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics, contract physicians, 2001–04 
Variable  Pooled 2001  2002 2003 2004 









































































































































Rental costs  11 698 
(3 997) 




































Standard deviation in parentheses.   34
Table 5 
Estimation results, (i) number of tests analysed at the office laboratory and (ii) relative change in 
service mix, Models 1–3 
Variable  Number of tests analysed at the office 
laboratory per consultation 
Relative change in service mix 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 




































































































Physician pop.  –  –  .006** 
(.002) 
– – –.008** 
(.004) 
Cost of labour  –  –  .322*** 
(.074) 
– – –.105 
(.127) 
Rental costs  –  –  .056** 
(.026) 
– – –.022 
(.034) 
Prop. high educ.  –  –  .044 
(.082) 
– – –.244* 
(.002) 
Prop. unempl.  –  –  .012* 
(.006) 
– – .002 
(.010) 
Prop. disabled  –  –  .079 
(.069) 















2  .013 .039  .060  .001 .014 .019 
Obs. 6613  6490  6054  6518  6397  5971 
 


























Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and **** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6  
Number of laboratory tests ordered from clinical laboratories (CL) per consultation 
Variables  (1) Number of tests 
ordered from CL per 
consultation 
(2) Number of tests 
ordered from CL per 
consultation 
(3) Number of tests 
ordered from CL per 
consultation 
Year Actual  Change  (%)  Actual  Change (%)  Actual  Change (%) 
2001 0.281    0.075    0.464   
2002 0.280  –0.4  0.076  1.3  0.467  0.7 
2003 0.281  0.4  0.073  –3.4  0.471  0.9 
2004 0.456  62.3  0.070  –4.1  0.488  3.6 
2001–04 (%)    62.3    –6.7    5.2 
(1) includes co-payment, (2) excludes co-payment, (3) includes co-payment and dummy for co-payment. 
 
Table 7 
Estimation results, (iii) number of tests ordered from clinical laboratories (CL), Models 2 and 3 
Variable  (1) Number of tests  
ordered from CL per 
consultation 
(2) Number of tests  
ordered from CL per 
consultation 
(3) Number of tests  
ordered from CL per 
consultation 











































































Robust standard errors in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 




Estimation results, community physicians, Models 2 and 3 
Variable  Number of tests analysed  
at the office laboratory 
per consultation 
Relative change in  
service mix  
(3) Number of tests  
ordered from CL per 
consultation 
































































             
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 




SUR results, Model 3 
Variable Number  of 
tests analysed  






(1) Number of 
tests ordered 
from CL per 
consultation 
(2) Number of 
tests ordered 
from CL per 
consultation 
(3) Number of 
tests ordered 
from CL per 
consultation 














       














       














2  .063 .016 .426 .034 .038 
Obs.  3908 3908 3908 3908 3908 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively; control variables not reported. 
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